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Abstract: The European Commission has recently proposed a new package of 
reforms  of  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact. The package  contains a  number of 
good proposals. In particular, the increased focus on debt ratios is a very positive 
suggestion though this should be strengthened further. However, some of the 
other proposals, such as the new principle of prudent fiscal management and the 
scoreboard  for  non-fiscal  imbalances,  are  poorly  thought  out  and  perhaps 
unworkable. A smaller number of well-focused proposals may end up working 
better than this complex, and perhaps overly ambitious, package. And a coherent 
policy to allow for orderly sovereign defaults in Euro area member states would 
probably  place  more pressure,  via  bond  markets,  on  states  to  get  their  fiscal 
houses in order than would the proposed system of fines. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This is based on a briefing paper delivered by the author  to the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs in his role as a member of an Expert Panel of advisors in relation to the 




The  sovereign  debt  crisis  that  is  currently  affecting  a  number of Euro-area  member 
states is partly due to due to a global financial crisis, the severity of which was not 
envisaged  when  European  Monetary  Union  was  designed.  However,  even  when 
factoring in the scale of the recent financial crisis, it is clear that the Stability and Growth 
Pact  (SGP),  as  implemented  since  the  beginning  of  EMU,  did  little  to  prevent  the 
emergence of serious fiscal problems. As a result, while the Euro area economy as a 
whole is returning to growth, alas stability is proving harder to obtain. 
 
The period since the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility in May of 
this  year  has  seen  an  intense  debate  about  the  future  of  economic  governance  in 
Europe. The EU Council established the van Rompuy Task Force to examine options for 
how things could be done differently in the future. The Task Force has collaborated with 
the European Commission which in turn has consulted with the European Parliament. 
The result of these efforts has been a series of detailed legislative proposals aimed at 
strengthening the preventative and corrective arms of the SGP, improving national fiscal 
frameworks  and  introducing  a  new  system  for  monitoring  and  correcting  non-fiscal 
macroeconomic imbalances of EU member states. 
 
The full set of legislative documents that has been put forward by the Council and the 
Parliament  contains  a  wide  range  of  proposals.
2  Indeed,  the  Task  Force,  the 
Commission and the Parliament are to be commended for having produced such an 
                                                 
2 The full legislative package refers to the following set of Commission proposals (i) COM(2010) 526 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and 
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (ii) COM(2010)522 amending Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (iii) 
COM(2010)523 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States (iv) COM(2010)524 on 
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (v) COM(2010)527 on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances and (vi) COM(2010)525 on enforcement measures to 
correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.  The proposals can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/eu_economic_situation/2010-09-
eu_economic_governance_proposals_en.htm  3 
 
impressive package of proposals in such a short time. However, my own assessment of 
these proposals is that a smaller amount of well-focused proposals may end up working 
better than this complex and, perhaps overly ambitious, package. 
 
I will start by discussing those aspects of the package that I consider important positive 
developments. The increased focus on debt levels is to be commended, though I still 
think these proposals do not go far enough. The proposals on improved national fiscal 
frameworks are also a very positive step.  
 
It is perhaps more important at this point, however, to pick out areas for improvement. 
In this paper, I will focus on two areas that appear to be poorly designed or unworkable. 
The first is perhaps the single biggest initiative in these proposals: A new principle of 
prudent fiscal management. Failure to adhere to the principle could trigger a Council 
recommendation for corrective action and, potentially, a fine. I argue that the concept 
of prudential fiscal management is not well defined, that it is asymmetric in focusing on 
expenditure more than taxation and that it would not have prevented the recent spate 
of fiscal crises.  
 
The  second  is  the  proposal  for  monitoring  and  prevention  of  non-fiscal  imbalances. 
While  broader  macroeconomic  monitoring  is  welcome,  these  proposals  have  been 
formulated in an unworkable fashion and also have an unfortunate “mission creep” 
aspect to them by extending EU warnings into areas that are not clearly of common 
European interest.  
 
Finally, I discuss the future role for bond market monitoring in preventing future crises 




2. Good Proposals 
 
2.1 The Increased Focus on Debt: But This Should Be Stronger 
 
Perhaps  the  biggest  weakness  in  the  way  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact  has  been 
implemented up to now has been an excessive focus on fiscal deficits rather than on 
debt levels. Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union clearly 
sets out excessive deficits as being judged relative to compliance with both a reference 
value for the deficit ratio and also “whether the ratio of government debt to gross 
domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing 
and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.” However, a definition of 
“satisfactory pace” was never provided and in practice, high debt ratios were never 
invoked in the opening of Excessive Deficit Procedures. Indeed, the period after 1999 
saw failures to meet the 60% reference value for the debt-GDP being about as common 
as compliance. 
 
For sure, an increased focus on debt would not have prevented some of the fiscal train-
wrecks that we have observed. (For example, Ireland had a debt-GDP ratio of 25% in 
2007.) However, a number of other member states entered into the global financial 
crisis with very high debt-GDP ratios, so that a severe recession was likely to push them 
into dangerous fiscal territory.  For example, in 2007, Belgium had a debt-GDP ratio of 
84%, Greece had a debt ratio of 96% and Italy’s debt ratio was 103%.
3   
 
The  new  proposals  put  forward  a  quantitative  guideline  as  to  what  constitutes  a 
satisfactory pace of progress towards the reference debt ratio. Progress is satisfactory if 
“the  differential  with  respect to the reference value  has  reduced  over  the  previous 
three years at a rate of the order of one-twentieth per year.”  These guidelines will now 
                                                 
3 These figures are taken from page 184 of the Spring edition of the Statistical Annex to European 
Economy. 5 
 
be combined with the previous focus on deficit levels when consideration is given to 
whether an Excessive Deficit Procedure should be opened. 
 
This increased focus on debt is to be commended. Ultimately, it is excessive levels of 
debt, rather than high deficits, which trigger serious problems such as high sovereign 
borrowing  rates  as  well  as  concerns  about  bailouts  and defaults.  Indeed, one  could 
argue that a strong focus on obtaining target levels of debt would make explicit deficit 
targets almost unnecessary: Deficit targets would fall out from what was required in 
relation to meeting the debt target. 
 
So while the increased focus on debt is a positive move, I believe it does not go far 
enough for a number of reasons. 
 
Slow Pace of Progress: The one-twentieth per year rate of progress that is deemed 
satisfactory is still very slow. For example, consider a member state that started out 
with a debt-GDP ratio of 120%. Calculations on the next page show that this country 
would not reach a ratio of 70% for thirty-five years even if it adhered to the proposed 
“satisfactory progress” guideline. It is easy to imagine member states making progress 
towards the target for five years in a manner consistent with this guideline and then 
falling back most of the way to their initial position.  
 
A guideline that encouraged stronger convergence would be more effective. The table 
on the next page provides an example of an alternative: A rule requiring convergence in 
the debt ratio of one percentage point plus one-twentieth of the gap relative to the 
reference value. This rule would see a country move from a 120% debt ratio to 70% in 








Debt Ratios: Proposed Adjustment and Alternative Adding One Percent Per Year 
 
Year  Proposed Rule 
Proposed Rule Plus One Percent 
Adjustment 
0  120    120 
1  117    116 
2  114    112 
3  111    109 
4  109    105 
5  106    102 
6  104    99 
7  102    96 
8  100    93 
9  98    90 
10  96    88 
11  94    86 
12  92    83 
13  91    81 
14  89    79 
15  88    77 
16  86    75 
17  85    73 
18  84    72 
19  83    70 
20  82    69 
21  80    67 
22  79    66 
23  78    65 
24  78    63 
25  77    62 
26  76    61 
27  75    60 
28  74    60 
29  74    60 
30  73    60 
31  72    60 
32  72    60 
33  71    60 
34  70    60 
35  70    60 7 
 
Relationship Between Debt and Deficit Rules: I would have preferred to see a more 
complete integration of the debt and deficit rules. The 3% deficit guideline is arbitrary. It 
may  be  consistent  with  an  increasing  debt  ratio  or  a  declining  one,  depending  on 
underlying economic growth conditions. And while exceeding a 3% deficit may make a 
bad debt problem worse if a country already has a high debt ratio, such a deficit might 
not be a problem at all for a country that has a low debt ratio.   
 
A greater focus on debt dynamics would promote the advantages of low debt ratios by 
making  clear  the  greater  flexibility  that  is  offered  by  maintaining  low  debt  levels. 
Countries with debt ratios below certain levels could be allowed to run larger deficits 
during recessions than those with high debt ratios. There is some suggestion that this 
may  in  fact  occur  in  the  future  as  the  proposals  indicate  that  “more  consideration 
should  be  given  to  relevant factors  in  the  event of non-compliance  with the  deficit 
criterion, if a country has a debt below the 60% of GDP threshold.” However, I would 
prefer to see a more explicit statement that the 3% deficit threshold need not apply to 
countries with low debt levels. 
 
Will It Be Used?: The proposals still suggest a reluctance to give a primary focus to debt 
levels, perhaps because a focus on debt rather than deficits will increase the pressure 
more intensely on specific countries than others in a way that a deficit-oriented focus 
would not.  While the proposals establish a numerical definition of satisfactory progress 
towards the reference level of debt, they apply a number of caveats when considering 
whether the numerical definition would actually be used  in relation to an excessive 
deficit  procedure.    So  we  are  told  that  “The  establishment  of  the  existence  of  an 
excessive deficit based on the debt criterion and the steps leading to it should not be 
based solely on non-compliance with the numerical benchmark, but always take into 
account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission report under 8 
 
Article 126(3) of the Treaty.”  This could mean that, in practice, the debt ratio still plays a 
minor role in generating excessive deficit procedure.
4 
2.2.  National Fiscal Frameworks 
 
The  proposals for  improvements  in  national  fiscal  frameworks  are  to  be  welcomed. 
External enforcement of budgetary discipline by the EU is always likely to be politically 
controversial  so  it  is  preferable  to  encourage  member  states  to  make  better  fiscal 
decisions in the future. Each of the proposals put forward are sensible and, if put in 
place,  may  be  more  effective  than  all  of  the  refinements  of  the  Excessive  Deficit 
Procedures that have been proposed. 
 
Proposals for improved statistical reporting of fiscal data are required if a repeat of the 
experience  with  Greek  fiscal  statistics  is  to  be  avoided.  Proposals  for  independent 
budgetary offices, national fiscal rules, and mandatory multi-year budgeting are also 
likely to help provide greater fiscal stability particularly in countries (such as Ireland) 
where  pro-cyclical  fiscal  policy  and  politicisation  of  the  budgetary  cycle  has  been 
endemic. 
 
One aspect of national fiscal frameworks that the proposals are relatively silent on is the 
timing and sequencing of budgetary decisions. I can certainly say that in the member 
state I most familiar with (Ireland) budgetary decisions tend to be presented as a fait 
accompli and passed quickly as a single bill on “Budget Day”. It is to be hoped that the 
demands for improved fiscal frameworks will lead to more detailed debate of fiscal 
measures. 
                                                 
4 An illustration of the general reluctance to prioritise the debt ratio is this curious comment from the 
explanatory memorandum accompanying COM(2010) 526 and other proposal documents: “in practice the 
‘3% of GDP’ threshold has been the almost exclusive focus of the EDP, with debt playing a marginal role so 
far. This owes to the less straightforward nature of the debt threshold compared to the deficit, including 
the ambiguity of the notion of sufficiently diminishing pace of reduction and the greater impact on the 
debt ratio of variables outside the control of the government, notably inflation.”   It is unclear to me why it 
is believed that inflation has a greater effect on debt ratios than it does on deficit ratios.  
 9 
 
3. Prudential Fiscal Policy-Making 
 
Other areas of the package of proposals strike me as being more problematic. The first 
problematic  suggestion  is  the  new  proposed  principle  for  prudential  fiscal  policy-
making.  
 
3.1.  Definition and Implementation 
 
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposals expresses dissatisfaction 
with the way the deficit criteria has been implemented in the preventative part of the 
SGP.    Satisfactory  progress  towards  meeting  the  medium-term  budgetary  objectives 
(MTO) has been measured in terms of improvements of 0.5% of GDP per year in the 
structural or cyclically adjusted budget deficit. The memorandum notes: 
 
the  structural  balance  has  in  practice  proved  an  insufficient  measure  of  a  country’s 
underlying fiscal position, owing to the difficulty of assessing the cyclical position of the 
economy in real time and to insufficient account being taken of revenue windfalls and 
shortfalls not directly related to the economic cycle (in particular housing and financial 
market developments). As a result, in a number of countries, even apparently sound 
budgetary positions before the crisis masked a strong reliance on windfall revenues to 
finance expenditure, the reversal of which contributed to soaring budget deficits.  
 
To deal with the perceived shortcomings of the current approach, a new principle of 
prudent fiscal policy making (PFM) is to be introduced. This principle is described as 
follows: 
 
This principle implies that annual expenditure growth should not exceed – and if the 
MTO has not been achieved should be clearly below – a prudent medium-term rate of 
growth of GDP, unless the MTO has been significantly overachieved or the excess of 
expenditure  growth  over  the  prudent  medium-term  rate  is  matched  by  discretionary 10 
 
measures on the revenue side. The essential aim is to ensure that revenue windfalls are 
not spent but are instead allocated to debt reduction. 
 
I think there are a number of serious problems with this principle. The first problem is 
that no definition of a prudent rate of medium-term growth has been provided. It is 
certainly true that is difficult to assess the cyclical position of the economy in real time. 
However, it is also the case that reasonable people can differ as to what constitutes a 
prudent rate of growth. If adopted, this proposal will likely run into severe political 
controversy: One can easily imagine controversies involving the Commission’s insistence 
that a particular member state’s “prudent” growth rate of nominal GDP is 2.5% and thus 
expenditure growth of 3% is excessive while the member state’s government insists that 
this rate of expenditure growth is perfectly consistent with long-run fiscal stability. 
 
A second problem is that the asymmetry between expenditure and taxation in the PFM 
principle is also of dubious merit. The principle suggests that countries get into fiscal 
problems by spending too much during good times. However, it does not focus at all on 
the other route to fiscal problems: The introduction of unsustainable tax cuts. A country 
that raises expenditure in line with the prudent growth rate but cuts tax rates in a way 
that will make financing this expenditure growth difficult in the future, could pass the 
PFM principle with flying colours.  
 
This asymmetry—focusing on the evils of excessive expenditure growth but failing to 
focus on unsustainable tax cuts—may be seen by some as stemming of a particular 
ideological viewpoint and this may add to the rule’s unpopularity if it is invoked as the 







3.2. Would the PFM Principle Have Helped? 
 
That the PFM principle is somewhat arbitrary and may prove controversial would not 
necessarily be a bad thing if the principle turned out to be useful in preventing fiscal 
crises. However, looking back at the historical data for four countries with serious 
current budgetary problems (Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain) suggests that it would not. 
 
The next few pages show some charts of expenditure and tax shares of GDP for these 
four countries. They start by focusing, like the PFM principle, on public expenditure. 
However the prudent growth rate is defined, it is likely that countries that violate the 
PFM principle will be observed to be increasing their public expenditure share of GDP: 
Expenditures will be rising at a faster pace than GDP over a period of a number of years.  
 
Let’s take a look first at Greece and Italy. Here’s the graph for the Greek public 
expenditure share up to 2007. It shows no trend in the expenditure share. Indeed, the 






Here’s the Italian share. This series was essentially flat during the period since 1999. The 




Here’s the same graph for Ireland. The series is essentially flat at 34% for much of the 
post-1999 period before a small uptick is seen in 2007 as the Irish economy started to 









And here’s Spain. Again, the share of GDP accounted for by public expenditure was 
essentially flat during the years prior to 2007. These charts show pretty clearly that the 
PFM principle would not have helped to prevent any of these countries falling into the 




It is easier to understand the fiscal difficulties these countries are in if we add the 
revenue share of GDP and also roll the series forward a couple of years to include the 
projections for 2010. The next graphs show revenue and expenditure shares for Greece 
and Italy. These graphs show that despite flat expenditure shares in the years leading up 
to 2007, both Greece and Italy ended up opening sizeable deficits. This occurred 
because both countries entered the recession with fiscal deficits (Greece’s deficit in 
2007 was already 5.1% of GDP) and then the recession lead to reduced tax revenues and 







The message I take from these figures is that a focus on the underlying deficit, and in 
particular the underlying debt ratio, is far more important in preventing fiscal crisis than 
attempting to make public expenditure follow a particular path relative to GDP. 
 
The charts below show the expenditure and revenue ratios for Ireland and Spain. In 
relation to the PFM principle, the proposals tell us that “The essential aim is to ensure 
that revenue windfalls are not spent but are instead allocated to debt reduction.”  If this 
is the case, then Ireland and Spain would appear to provide the relevant test cases. Both 15 
 
countries had substantial housing booms: In 2007, construction accounted for over 13% 





These temporary and unsustainable housing booms generated substantial windfall tax 
revenues for both countries. As the charts show, however, once the recession started 
and construction activity collapsed, both countries saw declines in revenue shares (the 
Irish decline occurred despite substantial increases in income tax rates to offset the loss 
of construction-related revenue) and increases in expenditure shares as large numbers 
of construction workers became unemployed.  16 
 
 
Despite these countries being clear examples of cases where revenue windfalls were not 
saved, the PFM principle would probably not have seen anything wrong with their 
conduct of fiscal policy because revenue was growing in line with GDP. (One could 
perhaps argue that Irish GDP growth rates in the years prior to 2007 were above a 
“long-run prudent” rate. However, the observed growth rates for this period were very 
close to the EU Commission’s estimates of Ireland’s potential growth rate.
5 ) 
 
These examples lead me to conclude that the Prudential Fiscal Policy-Making principle 
will have serious implementation problems, will cause political controversy, and 
ultimately would not help much to prevent future fiscal crises.  
 
Furthermore, the Irish and Spanish cases show that despite the well-known difficulties 
involved in assessing cyclically-adjusted budget deficits, this work is still essential if we 
want to understand whether fiscal positions that appear to be strong are, in fact, hiding 
potentially serious future problems. It is now clear that the Commission’s methodology 
for constructing cyclically adjusted budget deficits underestimated the transitory nature 
of the housing-related economic activity in these economies and that it also 
underestimated the sensitivity of tax revenues to declines in construction activities.  
 
One positive suggestion in this area is that the Commission improve its work on cyclical 
sensitivities of tax revenues. As I understand it, the methodology currently employed is 
based a highly aggregated level of detail (personal tax, corporate tax, social 
contributions and indirect taxes).  A move to a more detailed approach, based on co-
operation with member state Finance Departments, could allow for a closer 
examination of the relationship between tax revenues and movements in the cyclically 
sensitive housing sector. 
 
                                                 
5 Very helpfully, the Commission has made all the materials relating to potential output calculations 
available on a website at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/ecfin/outgaps/library. 17 
 
4. Monitoring of Non-Fiscal Imbalances 
 
In  addition  to  the  proposals  for  improved  monitoring  of  fiscal  policy,  the  package 
contains  a  series  of  proposals  relating  to  surveillance  and  correction  of  non-fiscal 
macroeconomic imbalances. The surveillance element will be based upon a scoreboard 
of  economic  indicators  which  could  include  current  account  balances,  real  effective 
exchange rates and developments in private sector debt. A poor score could trigger an 
in-depth review. And then: 
 
If the in-depth review points to severe imbalances or imbalances that jeopardise the 
proper functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union in a specific Member State, the 
Council may, on a recommendation from the Commission, adopt recommendations in 
accordance  with  Article  121(4)  of  the  Treaty  declaring  the  existence  of  an  excessive 
imbalance and recommending the Member State concerned to take corrective action 
within a specified deadline and to present its policy intentions in a corrective action plan.  
 
Finally, if corrective action is not taken, this could trigger a fine of 0.1% of GDP. 
 
There  is  a  lot  to  be  said  for  a  deeper  monitoring  by  the  EU  of  macroeconomic 
developments in member states. As the discussion of the Irish and Spanish cases above 
illustrated, the EU would perhaps have had a much better understanding of the fiscal 
fragilities of these countries if it had carried out more detailed analysis of developments 
in  their  property  markets  and  banking  systems.  However,  to  the  extent  that  the 
proposals focus on financial stability analysis, there is  likely to be a large degree of 
overlap with the proposed work of the European Systemic Risk Board. 
 
In addition, while deeper and more considered macroeconomic monitoring is a good 
idea, the same cannot be said for the “imbalance scoreboard”. The linkages between 
the various indicators that could go in the scoreboard (current account deficits, debt 18 
 
growth,  competitiveness)  are  subtle  and  complex  and  a  scoreboard  would  be  an 
unhelpful simplification. 
 
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposals shows some understanding 
of  the  difficulties  associated  with  the  scorecard  approach.  It  includes  the  following 
discussion: 
 
For instance, a current account deficit of 3 % may be considered acceptable in a 
converging country with strong investment needs but not in a more advanced country 
with a rapidly ageing population. The thresholds should therefore be seen as indicative 
values to guide the assessment, but should not be interpreted in a mechanical way; they 
should be supplemented by economic judgment and country-specific expertise. 
 
The  appeal  to  economic  and  judgment  and  country-specific  expertise  is,  I’m  afraid, 
expecting  far  too  much  of  the  economic  experts  available  to  Commission.  There  is 
simply not going to be any way to assess exactly what the “right” current account deficit 
(or surplus) should be. Furthermore, it will not be at all easy to spell out the mechanisms 
through which a country that has “too large” a current account deficit is supposed to be 
threatening the effective functioning of EMU. 
 
Extending  the  monitoring  exercise  to  focus  on  measures  of  competitiveness  is  also 
questionable. One suggestion for an item in the scoreboard is whether real wage growth 
has been running ahead of trends in productivity growth. This appears to assume that 
the  Commission  can  highlight  what  the  ideal  level  of  real  wage  growth  should  be 
relative to productivity growth. Since the ratio of real wage (W/P) to labour productivity 
(Y/L) is the same thing as the labour share of national income (WL/PY) this would place 
the Commission squarely in the middle of ideological debates about the appropriate 
distribution of income between capital and labour. Labour shares in Europe increased a 
lot in the 1970s and have declined a lot since then, for reasons that are not very well 19 
 
understood:  Why  should  the  European  Commission  believe  it  knows  what  the  right 
value should be for this share. Again, I have concerns that this approach is assuming that 
European  bureaucrats  understand  “how  to  run  an  economy”  better  than  any 
macroeconomic experts that I know. 
 
The  fact  that  the  scoreboard  seems  likely  to  combine  a  whole  series  of  unrelated 
indicators means that is likely to be subjected to the criticism that, rather than being 
“reasonably simple and underpinned by economic rationale” as these proposals suggest, 
it could be viewed as complex, incoherent and without sound underpinnings. I would 
recommend that the scoreboard be dispensed with. 
 
 
5. The Role of Sovereign Bond Markets 
 
While many of the proposals here make sense, the package as a whole feels a bit like an 
elaborate exercise to secure the barn door long after the horses have bolted. Even with 
the improvements suggested in these proposals, there are likely to be limits on how 
effective monitoring from the European Commission can be in preventing future fiscal 
crises. 
 
Sovereign bond markets also did little to prevent the current crisis. Indeed, the low rates 
that the sovereign bond markets offered to all Euro area countries—apparently based 
on the belief that no Euro area country could default—were a key factor enabling some 
of the Euro area member states to dig themselves into serious fiscal holes.   
 
It is likely, however, that this is an area where the future will differ from the past, 
independent of the European Union’s efforts to maintain budgetary stability through 
monitoring  and  fines.  Sovereign  bond  markets  have  now  realised  that  Euro  area 
member  states  may  well  end  up  defaulting  on  their  sovereign  debt.  The  German 20 
 
government’s recent position on this matter, if adopted, will ensure that sovereign debt 
markets are likely to monitor fiscal policy sustainability much more closely than in the 
past. 
 
Bond market monitoring is likely to prove more effective incentive than fines from the 
European Union. The European Union could require a country to provide an interest-
bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP if the EU Council decides to issue a recommendation to 
take corrective action. This could escalate to become a non-interest-bearing deposit if, 
after a complex set of deliberations, an Excessive Deficit Procedure is opened. Finally, 
this could escalate to be a fine of 0.2% of GDP if the member state fails to comply with 
initial recommendation to correct the deficit. 
 
Compare this process with the negative effects of worsening bond market sentiment. 
For example, consider a country with a debt-GDP ratio of 100% that is failing to reduce 
this debt at an adequate speed.  An increase in bond spreads of 1% would cost this 
country an additional 1% of GDP in interest costs. This would likely be a far greater 
incentive  for  the  member  state  to  get  its  fiscal  house  in  order  than  the  threat  of 
relatively modest fines from the EU.  
 
For  these  reasons,  clarification  of  the  Euro  area’s  position  in  relation  to  sovereign 
default is perhaps more important priority in the coming years than refinements to the 
enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
6. Less May Work Better Than More 
 
The  goals  of  the  Commission’s  package  of  measures—to  avoid  future  fiscal  crises 
through more effective monitoring and correction of fiscal and non-fiscal imbalances—
are laudable. However, I think the package foresees a future in which the EU tries to do 
too many things.  21 
 
 
Simpler,  less  complex  solutions  may  be  more  effective  than  the  proposals  in  this 
package: 
 
• A program of fiscal monitoring and correction that focuses heavily on getting debt 
ratios down to reasonable levels would work better than complex strategies involving 
arbitrary definitions of prudent fiscal monitoring.  
 
• A more detailed assessment of the sustainability of macroeconomic trends in Euro 
area member states is a good idea but arbitrary “imbalance scoreboards” are not.  
 
• A simple but well-articulated Euro area policy on sovereign default would help more 
than a complex and politically controversial fines process. 
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